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Abstract: We study e¢ ciency and fairness properties of the equal cost shar-
ing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a
binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss
criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individu-
ally rational and no-decit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In
general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mech-
anisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower
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maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions
is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.
JEL Classication: D71
Keywords: Binary public good, Excludability, Equal cost sharing, Maximal
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1 Introduction
An excludable and non-rivalrous binary public good is a good that can be
used by several agents in a group, with the possibility of excluding some
agents from its consumption. However, once an agent gains access to the
public good his valuation is independent of who else has access to it.3 A
group of agents, each privately informed about his valuation of the good,
has to jointly decide on its provisioning. The good costs a xed amount to
produce independent of the number of users. Two decisions have to be made:
(i) the set of users if the public good is provided, and (ii) the list of agents
contributions (or individual prices).
An example of the kind of problem we have in mind is the provision of
online classes. Suppose a world-famous scientist considers o¤ering a course
involving several online lectures. The lectures would be recorded and students
would be able to follow them at any time and any place. Of course, one
would rst need to enroll by paying a price to be able to virtually attend
these lectures, which takes the form of, say, visiting a website and entering an
individualized password. In this sense exclusion is feasible and, perhaps more
importantly, implementable. As importantly, an enrolled students value
does not depend on who else has access to the lectures, hence there are no
allocation externalities. In other words, following the lectures does not entail
rivalry in consumption. Teaching takes time and its cost on the lecturer
would typically depend on the size of his class in a lecture hall. But in the
online context the time value of the lecturer would be independent of who
he is virtually addressing, as all he would have to do would be to lecture
in front of a camera. Hence his compensation could reasonably be designed
independent of the users of the service he provides. Now (i) who among the
grand set of potential students should have access to these online lectures,
and (ii) how should they share the compensation of the lecturer?
These decisions will typically depend on agentsvaluations; however, since
these are private information they have to be elicited from the agents. In
other words, the mechanism that maps proles of valuations into allocations
or decisions must be incentive compatible. We impose the requirement of
strategyproofness that guarantees that no agent can gain by misrepresenting
his true valuation irrespective of his beliefs about the valuations of other
3For instance, Deb and Razzolini (1999a, 1999b), Dobzinski et al. (2008), Moulin and
Shenker (2001), Mutuswami (2005, 2008), Osheto (2000, 2005), Olszewski (2004), and Yu
(2007).
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agents. A second basic requirement is that the mechanism be individually
rational, i.e. an agent who is a user cannot be charged more than his valuation
while a non-user cannot make a positive payment. This requirement ensures
that all agents participate voluntarily in the decision-making process. Finally,
we shall require that there be no-decit, i.e. agents contributions should
cover the cost of provisioning the public good.
A simple and attractive mechanism that can be used to provide a binary
and excludable public good is the equal cost sharing with maximal participa-
tion (ECSMP) mechanism. It can be implemented by auction-like indirect
mechanisms.4 At every prole of valuations, the ECSMP mechanism selects
the allocation that maximizes (in the set-inclusion sense) the group of users
subject to the following requirements: (i) each users contribution is the cost
of provision divided by the number of users, (ii) this contribution is no greater
than his valuation, and (iii) all non-users pay zero. It is easy to verify that
this mechanism is well-dened at every prole and satises strategyproofness,
individual rationality and no-decit.
It is well-known that strategyproofness, individual rationality and no-
decit are incompatible with e¢ ciency. Since there is no rivalry in consump-
tion, excluding an agent with a strictly positive valuation is not e¢ cient
when aggregate valuation is above cost. Since individual rationality requires
that the contribution paid by each agent is not larger than his valuation of
the public good, agents will have incentives to misreport their own valuation
in order to lower their contribution. As a way out one could reduce prices,
possibly all the way to zero. But then one would violate the requirement of
no-decit. In view of this incompatibility, a second-best approach is increas-
ingly being adopted in the literature on mechanism design. This approach
identies a mechanism that minimizes the maximal welfare loss in the class
of all strategyproof and individually rational mechanisms.5
The welfare loss of a mechanism at a prole of valuations is the di¤erence
between the aggregate welfare of the rst-best and the aggregate welfare
of the mechanism evaluated at the prole. The maximal welfare loss of
4See Deb and Razzolini (1999a, 1999b).
5The worst-case welfare objective function is a well-established and widely-used crite-
rion. For applications in related areas, see Moulin and Shenker (2001), Moulin (2008),
and Juarez (2008a, 2008b) in the context of public good provision. See also Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou (1999), Roughgarden (2002), and Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) in
the computer science literature on the price of anarchy, introduced to measure the e¤ects
of selsh routing in a congested network.
4
a mechanism is the largest welfare loss, taken over all proles of valuations.
Then, each mechanism is evaluated according to its maximal welfare loss and
the goal is to select a mechanism that minimizes it. Since we are interested in
mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, it turns out that ine¢ ciencies
arise from the exclusion (as users) of some (or all) agents who have strictly
positive valuations. The maximal welfare loss of a mechanism is then the
sum of the valuations of all non-users of the good at the preference prole
which maximizes this sum.
We show that when there are two agents, the ECSMP mechanism mini-
mizes maximal welfare loss in the class of all strategyproof, individually ratio-
nal and no-decit mechanisms. However, this result does not hold in general:
we construct mechanisms which outperform ECSMP in terms of maximal
welfare loss. These mechanisms fail certain fairness properties, which are
inherent in ECSMP. We identify two such properties which we call weak
demand monotonicity and weak envyfreeness. When there are more than
two agents, these two properties come into conict with our second-best no-
tion of e¢ ciency. In the class of all strategy-proof, individually rational and
no-decit mechanisms which satisfy weak demand monotonicity or weak en-
vyfreeness, we show that the ECSMP mechanism minimizes maximal welfare
loss. Thus, if one wants to improve upon the level of "e¢ ciency" generated
by the ECSMP mechanism, one has to give up on these notions of fairness.
We say that a mechanism violates weak envyfreeness if there is a prole
of valuations where an agent with a lower valuation of the good is a user at
the cost of the exclusion of an agent with a higher valuation. This condition
is a weak notion of fairness in the sense that it is implied by the standard
conditions of envyfreeness6 or free entry.7 Weak demand monotonicity re-
quires that when the valuation of all agents (weakly) increases for the public
good, the set of users should not lose any member. This notion of fairness
is implied by demand monotonicity.8 These implications are discussed in
Section 5.
6See, for example, Sprumont (2013).
7See, for example, Deb and Razzolini (1999a, 1999b).
8See, for example, Ohseto (2000) and Deb and Razzolini (1999).
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2 Literature Review
Our paper complements the closely related paper of Dobzinski et al. (2008).
They show that the ECSMP mechanism is a maximal-welfare-loss minimizer
in the class of mechanisms that are strategyproof, budget balanced and that
satisfy an axiom called equal treatment. The authors write: "An interest-
ing research problem is to characterize the class of mechanisms obtained
by dropping the (admittedly strong) equal treatment condition." We do not
o¤er such a characterization because we do not claim that the ECSMP mech-
anism is the unique maximal-welfare-loss minimizer. However as mentioned
earlier, in the two agent case, we show that the ECSMP mechanism is a
maximal-welfare-loss minimizer in the larger class of mechanisms when the
equal treatment axiom is dropped and budget-balancedness is relaxed to the
no-decit condition.
For more than two agents, the example that we provide shows that the
result in Dobzinski et al. (2008) does not hold when budget balancedness is
relaxed to the no-decit condition (but equal treatment is maintained). The
Dobzinski et al. (2008) result is important because budget balancedness im-
plies a certain notion of e¢ ciency. Surpluses generate wastage when valuable
resources are not made use of. If however, surpluses can be committed to
other uses or agents (not under consideration), then budget balancedness may
seem to be a strong restriction. On the other hand, under our fairness crite-
ria, the budget balanced ECSMPmechanism is indeed a maximal-welfare-loss
minimizer.
Another related paper is Moulin and Shenker (2001). They consider the
provision of a binary, excludable public good when the cost function is a
submodular function of the set of users. They show that the mechanism as-
sociated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula (which corresponds to
the ECSMP mechanism for the case of a binary public good with xed cost of
provision) is the unique mechanism that minimizes maximum welfare loss in
the class of mechanisms that are dened from a cross monotonic cost sharing
method and are group strategyproof, individually rational, non-subsidizing
(the cost shares are non negative), budget balanced, and that satisfy con-
sumer sovereignty. Cross monotonicity requires the price paid by a user to
weakly decrease when the set of users expands.9 Group strategyproofness is
9Cross monotonicity is related to the axiom of population monotonicity introduced and
analyzed in Thomson (1983a, 1983b).
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an incentive compatibility requirement when coalitions of agents are allowed
to coordinate messages for mutual benet. Consumer sovereignty ensures
that every agent has a valuation that guarantees his participation irrespec-
tive of the valuations of other agents. Thus our result applies to a more
specialized setting than that in Moulin and Shenker (2001) but establishes
the optimality of the ECSMP mechanism amongst a much broader class of
mechanisms. We also note that strategyproofness is a more compelling axiom
than group strategyproofness from a decision-theoretic perspective. If agents
are ignorant of the valuations of other agents, assumptions about the ability
of coalitions to coordinate their messages for mutual benet require stronger
justication. Group strategyproofness can also be a demanding requirement
in this setting (see Juarez (2008b)).
3 Model
A binary and excludable public good is to be provided to a club of agents.
The grand set of agents is N = f1; :::; ng and a club is a possibly empty
subset of N . If the good is provided to no agent, i.e., if the club is empty, no
cost is incurred. Providing the good to any nonempty club generates a cost
of 1, regardless of the size or the membership structure of the club.
Each agent i 2 N has a type ti which gives his value for being in a club.
We assume that ti can take on any nonnegative value, in other words, the type
space is Ti = <+. A type prole is a vector t 2 <n+, and is exibly denoted
t = (ti; t i) for any i, where t i is a list of the types of all agents except for
i. Agentspayo¤s are quasilinear in money and there are no informational
or allocative externalities. Hence is payo¤ is determined by his own type
and payment only. In particular it does not depend on who else might be
included in the club. To be precise, suppose that club S is formed, is type
is ti and his payment is pi. Then his payo¤ is Ii(S)ti   pi where Ii(S) is the
indicator function, i.e., Ii(S) = 1 if i 2 S and Ii(S) = 0 otherwise.
A mechanism is a function m = (S; p) : <n+ ! 2N <n, which, for every
type prole t 2 <n+, determines a (possibly empty) club S(t), and a payment
pi(t) for every agent i 2 N . Note that agents inside or outside the club could
be making or receiving payments.
We are interested in a domain of mechanisms which satisfy three basic
requirements: strategyproofness, individual rationality and no-decit.
Denition 1 A mechanism m = (S; p) is admissible if it satises the follow-
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ing three conditions.
1. Strategyproofness (SP): for every i; t = (ti; t i) and t0i, Ii(S(t))ti  
pi(t)  Ii(S(t0i; t i))ti   pi(t0i; t i).
2. Individual Rationality (IR): for every i and t, Ii(S(t))ti   pi(t)  0.
3. No-decit (ND): for every t,
P
i2N pi(t)  1 whenever S(t) 6= ?, andP
i2N pi(t)  0 otherwise.
Let  be the class of admissible mechanisms. Notice that our conditions
are all ex post, eliminating the need to include a prior on the joint type space
in the model. Strategyproofness says that it is a weakly dominant strategy
for the agent to report his true type in the revelation game induced by the
mechanism. Individual rationality says that at every type prole each agent
receives at least his type-independent payo¤ from an outside option, which
we normalize to zero. Finally no-decit says that at every type prole the
cost of the club is covered by agentspayments.
We next give without proof a classical result on the characterization of
strategyproof and individually rational mechanisms (see Myerson (1981) for
example).
Proposition 1 A mechanism m = (S; p) is strategyproof and individually
rational if and only if for every i 2 N , there exist functions i : <n 1+ !
<+ [ f1g and hi : <n 1+ ! <+ such that for every t = (ti; t i)
1. if ti > i(t i), then i 2 S(t) and pi(t) = i(t i)  hi(t i),
2. if ti < i(t i), then i 62 S(t) and pi(t) =  hi(t i),
3. if ti = i(t i), then either [i 2 S(t) and pi(t) = i(t i)   hi(t i)] or
[i 62 S(t) and pi(t) =  hi(t i)].
Thus if m is strategyproof, then whether i will belong to the club at a
type prole or not depends on how his type compares to a cuto¤ i(t i)
determined by other agents types. If his type is above the cuto¤, then
i belongs to the club. Furthermore his payment is the di¤erence between
his cuto¤ and an amount hi(t i) which, again, is only dependent on others
types. If his type is below the cuto¤, then he does not belong to the club and
his payment is the negative of hi(t i). If, on the other hand, a mechanism
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m is generated by functions fi; higi=1;:::;n with these features, then it is
strategyproof. Furthermore a strategyproof mechanism m is individually
rational if and only if the functions hi are all nonnegative valued. In this
paper, we will always break the tie in case 3 of Proposition 1 in favor of
including the agent in the club. None of our results depend on this restriction.
The no-decit requirement in our notion of admissible mechanisms im-
poses a nontrivial condition on the cuto¤s and lump sum amounts associated
with a strategyproof and individually rational mechanism. A mechanism m
is admissible according to Denition 1 if and only if, at every t,
S(t) 6= ? implies
X
i2S(t)
i(t i) 
X
i2N
hi(t i)  1, and
S(t) = ? implies hi(t i) = 0 for all i 2 N
where the functions fi; higi=1;:::;n generate m as in Proposition 1. Note
that an admissible mechanism necessarily balances the budget whenever it
forms the empty club: pi(t) =  hi(t i) = 0 for all i. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no tractable characterization of the class  of admissible
mechanisms. We view this as the main di¢ culty in front of mechanism design
in our environment.
Maximal Welfare Loss E¢ ciency The classical notion of e¢ ciency dic-
tates in our model that a mechanism should either include all in the club,
or else, exclude all from the club. More precisely, m is e¢ cient if S(t) = N
whenever
P
i2N ti  1, and S(t) = ? otherwise. Hence under e¢ ciency the
public good is essentially non-excludable. This stems from the fact that once
the club has some member, the marginal net benet of including another is
nonnegative.
Unfortunately this notion of e¢ ciency is incompatible with the properties
that admissible mechanisms have to satisfy. In other words, there is nom 2 
which is e¢ cient. Even though this is a well-known result, let us review the
argument as it applies in our environment for the special case of two agents.
We will concentrate on three type vectors, (1; 0), (0; 1) and (1; 1). Suppose
that m is admissible and e¢ cient. Then S(1; 0) = S(0; 1) = S(1; 1) = f1; 2g
by e¢ ciency. Furthermore p2(1; 0) = p1(0; 1) = 0 by IR. Now SP gives
p2(1; 1) = p1(1; 1) = 0 as well, leading to a budget decit at (1; 1) and hence
to a contradiction with the assumption thatm is an admissible mechanism.10
10According to our denition of e¢ ciency the grand club must be formed at type vectors
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Given this impossibility, the literature has turned to relaxing either the
requirements that admissible mechanisms have to satisfy and/or e¢ ciency.
Of our interest is a relaxation of e¢ ciency called maximal welfare loss e¢ -
ciency. In order to dene this notion, we need some preparations.
First-best welfare at a type prole t, which we will denote W FB(t), is the
total welfare in the society achievable under complete information. Hence
W FB(t) = max
nX
i2N
ti   1; 0
o
:
First-best welfare serves as the benchmark to evaluate the performance of a
mechanism under incomplete information. For any m = (S; p) 2  and any
type prole t, let Wm(t) be the welfare generated by m at t, i.e.,
Wm(t) =
X
i2S(t)
ti  
X
i2N
pi(t):
Now let
WLm(t) = W FB(t) Wm(t):
Thus WLm(t) is the welfare loss of m at t in comparison to the rst-best.
Finally letMWLm denote the maximal welfare loss (MWL) of m taken over
all type proles, i.e.,
MWLm = sup
t2<n+
WLm(t):
Our mechanism designer will evaluate each mechanism m on the basis
of its maximal welfare loss MWLm and will be interested in employing a
mechanism whose maximal welfare loss is minimal.
Denition 2 For any subset 0  , we will say thatm is maximal welfare
loss e¢ cient in 0 if
m 2 arg min
m20
MWLm.
In what follows, we will investigate a particular mechanism, the equal cost
sharing with maximal participation mechanism, with respect to its maximal
welfare loss.
(1; 0) and (0; 1); although the empty club would have induced the same total welfare of
zero. However the argument would still work if we replaced (1; 0) and (0; 1) with (1; ")
and ("; 1) where " is a small positive number.
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4 Equal Cost Sharing with Maximal Partici-
pation
We begin by dening the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (EC-
SMP) mechanism, which will be the main focus of our paper. For any set
S  N , let #S denote the cardinality of S.
Denition 3 The equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP)
mechanism mE = (SE; pE) is dened as follows: for every t
SE(t) =
[
fS  Nnf?g : for all i 2 S, ti  1
#S
g
pEi (t) =
 1
#SE(t)
if i 2 SE(t);
0 otherwise.
The mechanism mE forms the largest club whose members can individu-
ally rationally and equally share cost. Indeed, for every t, ti  1=#SE(t) for
all i 2 SE(t), in other words, the set fS  N : for all i 2 S, ti  1=#Sg of
clubs is closed under the union operation. To see this, take two clubs T and
T 0 in fS  N : for all i 2 S, ti  1=#Sg. Note that for all i 2 T [ T 0, either
ti  1=#T  1=#(T [ T 0) or ti  1=#T 0  1=#(T [ T 0).
Clearly mE 2 .11 Note that mE is in particular budget-balanced, i.e., the
sum of agentscontributions exactly cover the cost of the club. Furthermore
mE has the following anonymity property: the associated cuto¤ functions
and their arguments are independent of the names of the agents. If there are
three agents, for example,
E1 (x; y) = 
E
2 (x; y) = 
E
3 (x; y) = 
E
3 (y; x):
To proceed, we will calculate the maximal welfare loss of mE.
Lemma 1 The maximal welfare loss of the ECSMP mechanism isMWLE =Pn
k=2 1=k.
Proof. We will rst show that WLE(t) <
Pn
k=2 1=k. If
P
i2N ti < 1, then
W FB(t) = WE(t) = 0 giving WLE(t) = 0 as well. So take any t such
11Strategyproofness of mE follows because the following monotonicity property is sat-
ised: if i 2 SE(ti; t i) and ti < t0i, then i 2 SE(t0i; t i).
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that
P
i2N ti  1 so that W FB(t) =
P
i2N ti   1. There are two cases. If
SE(t) = N , then WE(t) =
P
i2N ti   1 = W FB(t) and WLE(t) = 0. If
#SE(t) = n0 2 f0; 1; :::; n   1g, then let (t(1); t(2); :::; t(n n0)) be a listing
of the types of agents in NnSE(t) from highest to lowest, with ties broken
arbitrarily. We claim that t(k) < 1n0+k for every k = 1; :::; n   n0. If not, let
k0 be the largest k 2 f1; :::; n   n0g such that t(k)  1n0+k . It follows that
t(k)  1n0+k0 for all k  k0 and SE(t) should have had n0 + k0 instead of n0
members, a contradiction. Hence
WLE(t) =
X
i 62SE(t)
ti =
n n0X
k=1
t(k) <
n n0X
k=1
1=(n0 + k) 
nX
k=2
1=k
giving WLE(t) <
Pn
k=2 1=k as we wanted to show.
Hence for all t,WLE(t) <
Pn
k=2 1=k and consequentlyMWL
E Pnk=2 1=k.
To nish, we establish the reverse inequality by taking a sequence of type
vectors at which mE generates welfare losses converging to
Pn
k=2 1=k. For all
su¢ ciently small " > 0, let t" = (1  "; 1=2  "; :::; 1=n  "). Note SE(t") = ?
and if
P
i2N t
"
i  1, which happens if " is small enough, then WLE(t") =P
i2N t
"
i   1 =
Pn
k=2 1=k  n". Now as " # 0, WLE(t")!
Pn
k=2 1=k, indicat-
ing that MWLE = supt0WL
E(t0) Pnk=2 1=k.
We will now show that when there are only two agents, there is no ad-
missible mechanism in  whose MWL is less than that of mE.
Proposition 2 The ECSMP mechanism mE is maximal welfare loss e¢ -
cient in  if N = f1; 2g.
Proof. By Lemma 1, MWLE = 1=2. Suppose MWLm < 1=2 for some
m = (S; p) 2 . We rst claim that for all su¢ ciently small " > 0, we
must have S(1   "; 1=2   ") 6= ?. Otherwise Wm(1   "; 1=2   ") = 0 and
WLm(1 "; 1=2 ") = 1=2 2" givingMWLm  lim"#0WLm(1 "; 1=2 ") =
1=2, a contradiction. Similarly we must also have S(1=2  "; 1  ") 6= ? for
all su¢ ciently small " > 0. Fix such ". It follows that S(1   "; 1=2   ") =
S(1=2   "; 1   ") = f1; 2g as neither individual alone could individually
rationally cover the cost of a nonempty club at these type proles. Now SP
and IR imply
S(1  "; 1  ") = f1; 2g
p1(1  "; 1  ") = p1(1=2  "; 1  ")  1=2  " and
p2(1  "; 1  ") = p2(1  "; 1=2  ")  1=2  ";
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leading to a budget decit at the type vector (1 "; 1 "). Hence (S; p) could
not have been admissible.
Remark 1 The ECSMP is not the unique admissible mechanism that is
maximal welfare loss e¢ cient. Consider a mechanism where the cuto¤s are
symmetric and given by i(tj) = 1 + "  2"tj for tj  1=2, and i(tj) = 1=2
otherwise, with payments equal exactly to cuto¤s. If " is small enough, this
mechanism has the same MWL as the ECSMP mechanism, i.e., 1/2.
It turns out, however, that when N contains three agents or more, mE is
no longer maximal welfare loss e¢ cient in . To establish this, we will later
present an example of an admissible mechanism which is MWL superior to
mE. We will rst show, however, that there exist interesting subsets of 
wheremE is MWL e¢ cient even with n > 2 agents. To this end, we introduce
two distinct and arguably rather weak notions of fairness.
Denition 4 A mechanism m = (S; p) satises weak demand monotonicity
(wDM) if S(t)  S(t0) whenever ti  t0i for all i 2 N .
Denition 5 A mechanism m = (S; p) satises weak envyfreeness (wEF) if
for every i; j and t, i 2 S(t) whenever j 2 S(t) and ti > tj.
Note that neither condition has an imposition on how payments are deter-
mined. In a discussion section to follow, we will argue that these two condi-
tions are independent and that they are weaker than the demand monotonic-
ity, free entry and envy-freeness conditions that appear in the literature. Let
wDM and wEF denote the classes of admissible mechanisms satisfying wDM
and wEF respectively. It is clear that mE 2 wDM \ wEF .
Proposition 3 The ECSMP mechanism is maximal welfare loss e¢ cient in
wDM [ wEF .
Proof. We will prove this result here for the special case when N = f1; 2; 3g.
The argument extends to n > 3 agents at the cost of some investment in
notation as we show in Appendix 1. By Lemma 1, MWLE = 5=6.
We rst claim that if MWLm < 5=6, then, for " > 0 small enough,
m forms a nonempty club at the type proles (1   "; 1=2   "; 1=3   ") and
(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  "). If not, the welfare loss of m at these proles would
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be 5=6 3", and taking the limit as " falls to zero would giveMWLm  5=6,
a contradiction.
Now supposem = (S; p) satises SP, IR and ND, and thatMWLm < 5=6;
and x a su¢ ciently small " > 0 such that S(1   "; 1=2   "; 1=3   ") and
S(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") are both nonempty.
Weak demand monotonicity: Suppose that m satises wDM as well.
We claim that 3 2 S(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  "). To see this, rst note that, by the
observation above, m forms nonempty clubs at the type proles (1  "; 1=2 
"; 1=3  ") and (1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  "). If 3 belongs to either of these clubs,
then 3 2 S(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") as well by wDM. If not, then,
S(1  "; 1=2  "; 1=3  ") = f1; 2g = S(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  ")
by ND and IR. Now SP and IR give
f1; 2g  S(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ");
p1(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") = p1(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") < 1=2, and
p2(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") = p2(1  "; 1=2  "; 1=3  ") < 1=2:
Hence 3 2 S(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") so that no-decit obtains, as we wanted to
show. Now the same reasoning applies and 1 2 S(1=3   "; 1   "; 1   ") and
2 2 (1   "; 1=3   "; 1   "). Using SP and IR once again we conclude that
S(1   "; 1   "; 1   ") = f1; 2; 3g but no agent makes a payment larger than
1=3  " at this type prole. This leads to a budget decit, and therefore, to
a contradiction. Hence m cannot satisfy wDM.
Weak envy freeness: Suppose now that m satises wEF. Then 1 2
S(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") since otherwise S(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") = f2; 3g
and wEF fails. Similarly 2 2 S(1  "; 1=2  "; 1=3  "). Consequently
f1; 2g  S(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  "),
p1(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") = p1(1=2  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") < 1=2, and
p2(1  "; 1  "; 1=3  ") = p2(1  "; 1=2  "; 1=3  ") < 1=2.
Thus we must have, as in the case of wDM, 3 2 S(1   "; 1   "; 1=3   ")
to avoid a budget decit. Same reasoning applies in getting 1 2 S(1=3  
"; 1  "; 1  ") and 2 2 (1  "; 1=3  "; 1  "). Consequently, by SP and IR,
S(1   "; 1   "; 1   ") = f1; 2; 3g, with pi(1   "; 1   "; 1   ") < 1=3 for all i,
and m fails ND.
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It is instructive to juxtapose the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 in order
to understand the complications that arise with three or more agents. Both
proofs rely on exploiting the behavior of mechanisms at hand at certain
critical type proles. For small enough " > 0, take the prole (1  "; 1=2  ")
in the two-agent case, and the prole (1 "; 1=2 "; 1=3 ") in the three-agent
case. To beat mE in MWL, an alternate mechanism must form nonempty
clubs at these proles. Now in the former scenario, this nonempty club is
necessarily the grand coalition f1; 2g. In the latter, however, the nonempty
club is either the grand coalition f1; 2; 3g, or one of the doubletons f1; 2g
and f1; 3g. It is precisely this multiplicity of possible clubs at critical proles
that creates the complications with three or more agents. We need, in order
to attain a budget decit at the prole (1   "; 1   "; 1   "); that at every
permutation of the prole (1   "; 1   "; 1=3   ") the agent whose type is
1=3   " should belong to the club formed. Unfortunately, admissibility of a
mechanism alone may fail to lead to this conclusion as our Example 1 below
shows.
In order to show that Proposition 3 is tight, in other words, to show that
a failure of wDM and wEF leads to the suboptimality of mE, we will next
present a class of admissible mechanisms obtained from small perturbations
of mE. In doing so we will make use of the anonymity property, which is also
satised by the perturbations by construction.
Example 1 Suppose N = f1; 2; 3g and take " 2 (0; 1=24). Consider the
following perturbation of the ECSMP mechanism mE, which we call m" and
present together with mE for comparison purposes. Both mE and m" are
anonymous and the diagrams give the cuto¤s, denoted k and 
"
k respectively,
of some k 2 N as a function of (ti; tj) where i, j and k are distinct agents in
N .
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The cuto¤s for mE and m"
In both diagrams the arguments of k and 
"
k are omitted to economize
on space. For both mechanisms, at any vector (ti; tj) which lies at the border
of two or more distinct regions, the e¤ective cuto¤ is the smallest one. At
(ti; tj) = (1=3; 1=2) for example, mE imposes a cuto¤ of 1=3 on agent k.
Similarly at (ti; tj) = (2=3 + "; 1=2), m" imposes the cuto¤ 1=3   " on k.
Both mechanisms charge each member of any nonempty club exactly his
cuto¤. Hence their hi functions are zero-valued.
We would like to point out various features of the mechanism m" in Ex-
ample 1.
1. Generated by symmetric cuto¤ functions as given in the plot, m" satis-
es SP. Furthermore since the associated hi functions are zero-valued,
IR obtains and members of any club pay their cuto¤s. In Appendix 2,
we exhibit how m" behaves in detail by partitioning <3+ into 6 distinct
sets of type vectors and analyzing them individually.
2. As " vanishes, the mechanism m" converges (pointwise) to mE. Hence
we interpret m" to be a perturbation of mE.
3. In order to calculate the maximal welfare loss MWL" of m", take the
type vectors (1=3   "; 1=2; 1) and (1=3 + 2"; 1=3 + 2"; 1) or any one of
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their permutations. At type vectors su¢ ciently close to these vectors
from below -as represented by dots in the diagram- we will now show
that m" forms the empty club. Let us verify this leisurely. First take
(1=3   "; 1=2; 1) and a su¢ ciently small  > 0. Omitting subscripts
note that the cuto¤s imposed by m" are
"(1=3  "  ; 1=2  ) = 1,
"(1=3  "  ; 1  ) = 1=2, and
"(1=2  ; 1  ) = 1=3  ":
Hence if t is su¢ ciently close to (1=3   "; 1=2; 1) from below, then
S(t) = ?, causing a welfare loss of 5=6  ".
Similarly if we take (1=3 + 2"; 1=3 + 2"; 1) and a small  > 0, we get
"(1=3 + 2"  ; 1=3 + 2"  ) = 1,
"(1=3 + 2"  ; 1  ) = 1=2.
Note that as " < 1=24, 1=3+2" < 1=2. Hence at type vectors su¢ ciently
close to (1=3 + 2"; 1=3 + 2"; 1) from below, no agent meets his cuto¤
and the empty club is formed. The associated welfare loss this time
is 2=3 + 4" < 5=6 as " < 1=24. In either case MWL" < MWLE.
Appendix 2 demonstrates in detail the calculation of MWL".
4. An interesting question is to identify that " for which MWL" is the
lowest among fm" : 0 < " < 1=24g. This obtains by equating the two
candidates forMWL" above: 5=6 " = 2=3+4", which gives " = 1=30.
In other words
inf
0<"<1=24
MWL" = MWL1=30 =
4
5
:
5. Our perturbation m" fails both wDM and wEF. For example, m" forms
the club f2; 3g at the type prole (1=3 + 2"; 2=3 + "; 1=3): However,
when all types are larger at (1; 1; 1=3 + "), m" excludes 3 and forms the
club f1; 2g. This is a failure of wDM. Furthermore, the fact that agent
1 does not belong to the club f2; 3g at (1=3 + 2"; 2=3 + "; 1=3) even
though t1 > t3 is a failure of wEF. This was of course to be expected
because of Proposition 3 above: any mechanism which satises wDM
or wEF cannot possibly be superior to mE in MWL.
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6. We would like to re-emphasize that m" is by construction anonymous:
for every i; t and permutation  on f1; 2; 3g,
m"i (t1; t2; t3) = m
"
(i)(t(1); t(2); t(3)):
Let A be the class of anonymous and admissible mechanisms. Thus
the ECSMP mechanism mE is not MWL e¢ cient in A as m" 2 A.
This notion of anonymity is, of course, stronger than anonymity in util-
ity terms, which appears in Sprumont (2013). It appears in Dobzinski
et al. (2008) where it is called equal treatment.
7. As opposed to the equal sharing mechanism mE, its perturbation m"
is not budget balanced. However the budget surplus induced by m" is
at most 6" and this is not large enough to o¤set the e¢ ciency gain in
the worst-case scenario. Details are in Appendix 2.
5 Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, wDM and wEF are novel modications of
closely related (and stronger) conditions that appear in the literature. Note
that there is no logical implication between our conditions. To see this sup-
pose N = f1; 2; 3g. Suppose that S(t) = f1g if t1  1 and S(t) = ?
otherwise, with agent 1 being charged the full cost of the club whenever he
is in the club. This mechanism is in , it satises wDM and fails wEF. On
the other hand consider the mechanism given by S(t) = fig if tj  1, tk  1
and 1  ti, with i; j and k distinct, and and S(t) = ? otherwise. Suppose
that the agent in the club covers the cost of the club fully. This mechanism
belongs to , satises wEF but fails wDM. Thus the class wDM [wEF on
which me is MWL e¢ cient is a strict superset of both wDM and wEF .
We note that Proposition 2 is not a corollary to Proposition 3, as there
exist admissible mechanisms outside wDM [wEF in 2-agent environments.
As an example, consider the mechanism dened by S(t) = ? if t1 < 1,
S(t) = f1; 2g, p1(t) = 1 and p2(t) = 0 if 1  t1 < 2 and S(t) = f1g and
p1(t) = 1 if t1  2:
Our wDM condition is a straightforward weakening of the demand monotonic-
ity condition that appears in Ohseto (2000), which requires, on top of our
wDM, that S(t) = S(t0) whenever ti  t0i for every i 2 S(t) and t0i  ti for
every i 62 S(t).
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Furthermore for any admissible mechanism, our wEF condition is implied
by the free entry condition which appears in Deb and Razzolini (1999). A
mechanism m satises free entry if for every i; j and t, i 2 S(t) whenever
j 2 S(t) and ti > pj(t). Suppose that m is a admissible mechanism which
satises free entry. If for some t, i and j, j 2 Sm(t) and ti > tj, then
ti > p
m
j (t) as well by individual rationality. Consequently i 2 Sm(t) by free
entry. This establishes that m satises wEF as well.
A di¤erent condition that implies wEF is the classical notion of envyfree-
ness (see, for example, Sprumont 2013). A mechanism m is envyfree if for
every t, i and j, Ii(S(t))ti   pi(t)  Ij(S(t))ti   pj(t). Suppose that m is a
admissible mechanism. If at some type prole t, j 2 S(t) and i 62 S(t) even
though ti > tj, then i envies j since
Ii(S(t))ti   pi(t) = 0
< ti   tj
 Ij(S(t))ti   pj(t)
where the weak inequality follows by individual rationality. Hence if m is an
envyfree and admissible mechanism, it also satises wEF.
6 Conclusion
The ECSMP mechanism is a simple and appealing procedure with desir-
able incentive properties. We show in this paper that, in general, it is not
maximal welfare loss e¢ cient. Hence a mechanism designer with the worst-
case-scenario in mind, may opt to employ a di¤erent mechanism, perhaps
a small perturbation of ECSMP which may lead to budget surplus as we
exhibit in Example 1. If the designer is restricted to use a mechanism with
certain fairness properties (as embodied in our weak demand monotonicity or
weak envyfreeness conditions), however, then ECSMP cannot be improved
upon.
We leave for future work the investigation of the consequences of re-
placing the no-decit condition in our denition of admissible mechanisms
with budget balance. As we remarked above, our perturbation of the EC-
SMP mechanism which fares better in terms of maximal welfare loss leads
to budget surpluses. Hence it may very well be that ECSMP mechanism
is maximal welfare loss e¢ cient within the class of admissible and budget
balanced mechanisms.
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We also leave for future work the ambitious question of how to solve the
mechanism design problem
min
m2
MWLm.
We perceive the main di¢ culty here to be the absence of a tractable charac-
terization of the set  of strategyproof, individually rational and no-decit
mechanisms.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 3
Let N = f1; :::; ng where n > 3. Here we will generalize the argument
presented in the main text for n = 3. To this end we will need to develop some
notation. For any type vector t 2 <n+, let P (t) be the set of all permutations
of t. In other words t0 2 P (t) i¤ there is a bijection  : N ! N such that for
every i, ti = t0(i). Now for any " 2 (0; 1=n) and any k = 1; :::; n, dene the
type vector tk(") as follows:
tki (") =

1  " if i  k;
1=i  " if k < i:
Hence
t1(") = (1  "; 1=2  "; 1=3  "; :::; 1=n  ");
t2(") = (1  "; 1  "; 1=3  "; :::; 1=n  ");
  
tn(") = (1  "; :::; 1  "):
Now let
T k(") = P (tk(")) for every 1; :::; k:
Note that k also indicates the number of agents whose types are 1   " in
every element of T k("). Furthermore if k > 1, then for every t 2 T k("), there
exists some t0 2 T k 1(") such that
ti =

t0i if t
0
i 6= 1=k   ", and
1  " if t0i = 1=k   ".
Hence for every k > 1 and every t 2 T k("), there exist k vectors t1; :::; tk 2
T k 1(") such that t is obtained by increasing the type of the agent with
1=k   " in any one of t1; :::; tk to 1  ".
If " is small enough, any mechanism which has a lower maximal welfare
loss than ECSMP must form a nonempty club at all members of T k(") for
every k. We record this rather straightforward observation next.
Lemma 2 If m = (S; p) 2  and MWLm < MWLE, then there exists
" > 0 such that for every " 2 (0; ") and t 2 Snk=1 T k("), S(t) 6= ?.
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Proof. Take a mechanism m = (S; p) 2  with MWLm < MWLE. Recall
that MWLE =
Pn
i=2 1=i. By construction of the sets fT k(")gk=1;:::;n, if
t 2 T k 1(") and t0 2 T k("), then Pni=1(t0i   ti) = 1   1=k > 0 for k > 2.
Consequently for any list ftkgk=1;:::;n where tk 2 T k(") for every k, the numberPn
i=1 t
k
i is increasing in k. Thus if S(t
k) = ? for all k, thenWLm(tn) >    >
WLm(t1). So it su¢ ces to show that S(t) 6= ? for every t 2 T 1("). Suppose,
towards a contradiction, that for every " > 0, there exists some " 2 (0; ")
and t(") 2 T 1(") such that S(t(")) = ?. Then there exists a sequence
f"qg & 0 and a corresponding sequence of type vectors tq 2 T 1("q) such that
S(tq) = ? for all q: Note that such tq is a permutation of the type vector
(1   "; 1=2   "; :::; 1=n   "). Then WLm(tq) ! Pni=2 1=i, a contradiction to
the hypothesis MWLm <
Pn
i=2 1=i. Thus our supposition is false: there
exists " > 0 such that if " 2 (0; ") and t 2 T 1("), S(t) 6= ?.
From now on we will x such small " 2 (0; ") and to economize on notation
we will write T k instead of T k("). We will also denote by t the type vector
(1   "; :::; 1   "), the unique element of T n. Our goal is to show that if
(1) m = (S; p) is strategyproof and individually rational, (2) MWLm <Pn
k=2 1=k and (3) m satises wDM or wEF, then m runs a budget decit at
some t 2 Snk=1 T k.
To begin, take a strategyproof and individually rational mechanism m =
(S; p) such that MWLm <
Pn
k=2 1=k.
Case 1: Weak Demand Monotonicity Suppose that m additionally
satises wDM. Write
T n 1 = ft1;n 1; t2;n 1; :::; tn;n 1g;
where for every k, tk;n 1k = 1=n  " and tk;n 1i = 1  " for all i 6= k. Note that
the only di¤erence between the type proles tk;n 1 and t is agent ks type:
ti =

tk;n 1i if i 6= k, and
1  " > tk;n 1k if i = k.
This observation has an important consequence, which we will use recursively
below. Note that S(tk;n 1) 6= ? by the Lemma above. Now if k 2 S(tk;n 1),
then, by SP and IR,
k 2 S(t) and pk(t) = pk(tk;n 1)  1=n  ":
24
There are two possibilities: (1) k 2 S(tk;n 1) for every k and m runs a
budget decit at t, in which case the proof for Case 1 is complete, or (2)
k0 62 S(tk0;n 1) for some k0. Suppose the latter case, and in particular, without
loss of generality, k0 = 1.
Now consider the following subset of T n 2:
T n 2(1) = ft 2 T n 2 : t1 = 1=n  "g.
Hence t 2 T n 2(1) i¤ n  2 agents have type 1  ", agent 1 has type 1=n  "
and a di¤erent agent has type 1
n 1 ". Now to pin down this di¤erent agent,
we write
T n 2(1) = ft2;n 2; t3;n 2; :::; tn;n 2g:
where tk;n 2k =
1
n 1   ". Note that for every k > 1, t1;n 11 = tk;n 21 = 1=n  "
and
t1;n 1i =

tk;n 2i if i 6= k, and
1  " > tk;n 2k if i = k.
Note that since t1;n 1i  tk;n 2i for all i and since we supposed 1 62 S(t1;n 1)
above, wDM implies 1 62 S(tk;n 2) for any k = 2; :::; n. However S(tk;n 2) 6= ?
by the Lemma. Now using the exact same logic of the previous paragraph,
if some k 2 S(tk;n 2), then, by SP and IR,
k 2 S(t1;n 1) and pk(t1;n 1) = pk(tk;n 2)  1
n  1   ":
Once again, there are two possibilities: (1) k 2 S(t1;n 1) for all k > 1,
leading to a budget decit and the termination of the proof of Case 1, or (2)
k0 62 S(tk0;n 2) for some k0 > 1. Suppose the latter case and, without loss of
generality, k0 = 2.
Continuing in this fashion, suppose k 62 S(tk;n k) for all k = 1; :::; n   2
and write
T 1(1; 2; :::; n  2) = ftn 1;1; tn;1g.
Now wDM implies that agents 1; :::; n  2 should belong to neither S(tn 1;1)
nor S(tn;1). However, since a club must be formed at both type vectors, we
must have
S(tn 1;1) = S(tn;1) = fn  1; ng.
This follows because tn 1;1n 1 = t
n;1
n = 1=2  " and tn 1;1n = tn;1n 1 = 1  ". Thus
at either type vector no agent can individually rationally nance the club
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alone. Hence, by SP and IR,
n  1; n 2 S(tn 2;2),
pn 1(tn 1;1) = pn 1(tn 2;2)  1=2  ", and
pn(t
n;1) = pn(t
n 2;2)  1=2  ":
But now to avoid a budget decit at tn 2;2 agent n  2 must be included in
S(tn 2;2) which is the contradiction we need to nish the proof of Case 1.
Case 2: Weak Envyfreeness Now suppose that m additionally sat-
ises wEF . Dene for every k = 1; ::::; n  1 and every t 2 T k
Nkk (t) = fi 2 N : ti = 1  "g and
Nkk+1(t) = fi 2 N : ti 
1
k + 1
  "g.
Note that Nkk (t) and N
k
k+1(t) di¤er by a unique element, and this is the agent
whose type is 1
k+1
  ". Call this agent i(t), the agent with the highest type
at t which is not 1  ". It follows that
Nkk+1(t) = N
k
k (t) [ fi(t)g:
Claim: For every k = 1; :::; n  1 and every t 2 T k, Nkk+1(t)  S(t).
Proof of the claim: We will use induction. Let k = 1 and take any
t 2 T 1. Since S(t) contains some agent, it contains the agent with type 1 ".
In other words, N11 (t)  S(t). However we cannot have N11 (t) = S(t) as
this would either violate IR, or lead to a budget decit. Hence S(t) contains
other agents and one of these must be i(t) by wEF. Thus
N11 (t) [ fi(t)g = N12 (t)  S(t):
Now suppose, as induction hypothesis, that for some k 2 f2; :::; ng,
Nk 1k (t)  S(t) for all t 2 T k 1. Take any t 2 T k. There exist, by con-
struction of the sets T 1; :::; T n, type vectors t1; :::; tk 2 T k 1 such that for
every l = 1; :::; k
ti =

tli if i 6= i(tl), and
1  " if i = i(tl).
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It follows that
i(tl) 2 Nk 1k (tl)  S(tl):
Furthermore by SP and IR
i(tl) 2 S(t) and
pi(tl)  1=k   " for every l.
Note that fi(tl) : l = 1; :::; kg = Nkk (t), thus Nkk (t)  S(t). But Nkk (t)
cannot cover the cost of the club at t. Hence either there is budget decit
at t, or there is at least one more member in S(t). By wEF this member is
i(t) and
Nkk (t) [ fi(t)g = Nkk+1(t)  S(t)
proving the claim.
To nish the proof of Proposition 2, not that we have for all t 2 T n 1
N = Nn 1n (t)  S(t)
where the equality is by construction of the sets Nkk+1(t) and the set inclusion
is by the claim. Since S(t)  N as well by denition, S(t) = N for all
t 2 T n 1. By SP and IR, therefore
S(t) = N and
pi(t
)  1=n  " for all i,
leading to a budget decit at t. 
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Appendix 2: Perturbation of ECSMP
In this appendix, we will elaborate on the family of mechanismsm" which
we introduced in Example 1. Suppose that N = f1; 2; 3g and take " 2
(0; 1=24). We would like to re-emphasize that m" ! mE pointwise as "! 0
and that m", just like mE, is an anonymous mechanism.
We will describe m" in a series of diagrams, each corresponding to a
particular interval of t3 values in the (t1; t2) space. Sincem" is anonymous, we
need only depict its behavior above the 45 degree line in each diagram. Below
the 45 degree line, the mechanism behaves symmetrically, with the roles of
agent 1 and 2 reversed. In every diagram, we will only indicate the payments
made by the agents. The club that forms at any type prole is precisely the
set of agents for whom a payment is specied in the corresponding area of a
diagram. We will denote by W ", WL" and MWL", the welfare, the welfare
loss and the maximal welfare loss of the mechanism m".
For 0  t3 < 1=3 " and 1=3 "  t3 < 1=3+2", m" is dened as follows:
The mechanism m" behaves identical to mE when t3 < 1=3   " with
payments p"2 = 1 whenever S
" = f2g, and p"1 = p"2 = 1=2 whenever S" =
f1; 2g. In particular supt:t3<1=3 "WL"(t) = 5=6   ", with the supremum
as the limit of type vectors converging from below to (1=2; 1; 1=3   ") and
(1; 1=2; 1=3  ").
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Next consider the case 1=3 "  t3 < 1=3+2". Here p"2 = 2=3+" and p"3 =
1=3 " whenever S" = f2; 3g. The club f2; 3g is formed in order to cover the
area where mE su¤ers large welfare losses, i.e., when types are approaching
from below to (1=2; 1; 1=3). At any t where S" = f2; 3g, t1  1=3 + 2" > t3.
Hence m" excludes higher type agents from clubs at the benet of lower type
agents, and therefore violate wEF. Furthermore,m" also violates wDM: when
all types increase the club formed could change from f2; 3g to f1; 2g or from
f1; 3g to f1; 2g. Note also that supt:t32[1=3 2;1=3+2") WL"(t) = 2=3 + 4" which
falls short of MWLE = 5=6 as we took " < 1=24. This supremum is the
limit of welfare losses that converge (from below) to the critical type vector
(1=3 + 2"; 1; 1=3 + 2").
We move on to higher values for t3. When 1=3 + 2"  t3 < 1=2 and
1=2  t3 < 2=3 + ", m" is dened as follows:
Inspecting type proles close to (1=3 "; 1; 1=2) and (1=3+2"; 1=2; 2=3+"),
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we nd
sup
t:t32[1=3+2";2=3+")
WL"(t) = maxf5=6  "; 1=2 + 3"g
< 5=6
= MWLE.
Budget surpluses begin in this range for t3. The largest surplus is 6" which
appears in the set
[1=3 + 2"; 2=3 + ") [1=3 + 2"; 2=3 + ") [1=3 + 2"; 2=3 + ").
As we will see below these surpluses are necessary to avoid budget decits
at higher values for t3.
Further, note that clubs f1; 2g form in when 1=3 + 2"  t3 < 1=2 at type
vectors where t3 exceeds t1 or t2, indicating another failure of wEF. These
clubs disappear as t3 rises beyond 1=2. Take the club f1; 2g which forms
when 1=3   "  t1 < 1=3 + 2", t2  2=3 + " and 1=3 + 2"  t3 < 1=2 for
example. As t3 increases beyond 1=2, this club disappears and in its stead,
f2; 3g forms. These are violations of wDM which are analogous to those that
occur for lower values of t3, with the names of the agents interchanged.
Finally, for t3  2=3 + ", m" is dened as follows:
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The unique di¤erence between the two diagrams is that for t3 < 1 the empty
club is formed at low values of (t1; t2) whereas when t3  1, the singleton
club f3g forms at corresponding values of (t1; t2). Note that
sup
t:2=3+"t3<1
WL"(t) = maxf5=6  "; 2=3 + 4"g < 5=6 = MWLE
as " < 1=24. Furthermore
sup
t:t31
WL"(t) = 6" < 5=6 = MWLE
and this is caused solely by budget surpluses.
The new club f1; 3g which appears when 2=3 + "  t3 < 1 serve the
purpose of keeping the welfare loss below 5=6. However they produce an
important side e¤ect. Take, for example, the club f1; 3g that forms when
1=3   "  t1 < 1=3 + 2" and 1=3 + 2"  t2 < 1=2. First note that this is
a violation of wEF. Next, since agent 1 now has a lower cuto¤, 1=3   ", his
payment is lower in every club formed when his type increases and other two
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types remain constant. In particular when t1 > 2=3 + ", note that budget is
exactly balanced. This gives the rationale for budget surplus in the previous
plot in the same area when 1=2  t3 < 2=3 + ".
As a nal note, equating 5=6   " = 2=3 + 4" we nd " = 1=30, the
value for " which induces the lowest maximal welfare loss, 4=5, in the class
fm" : 0 < " < 1=24g.
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